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The Ideology of Legal Interpretation
Sara C. Benesh*
Jason J. Czarnezki**
INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars and political scientists often disagree over the
degree to which legal interpretive strategies might, at least in part,
drive judicial decision-making. In other words, when a judge uses
"originalism" to interpret the Constitution, does she do so because
she truly adheres to that strategy and finds its result determinative, or
does she do so as a means to an ideological end? Political scientists
most often consider "the law," as measured by case facts or precedent
or invocations of the intent of the framers, mere "window dressing"
that provides cover for judges to vote in accordance with their
preferred policy outcome. Legal scholars, more often than political
scientists, attribute decisions to legal analysis.'
But it is difficult to separate the influence of the legal and the
attitudinal, due to the conflation of legal and ideological preferences.
For example, political scientists Sara Benesh and Harold Spaeth
argue that, in order to model the role of law on dissenting behavior on
* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; Ph.D.
(1999), Michigan State University.
** Associate Professor of Law, Vermont Law School; A.B. (2000), J.D. (2003),
University of Chicago. The authors wish to thank Eileen Braman, William Ford, Chad King,
and participants in the Marquette University Law School Faculty Workshop Series for their
helpful comments. All errors, of course, remain our own.
1. See, e.g., HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY
WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999); Jason J. Czarnezki &
William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation,
65 MD. L. REv. 841 (2006); Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court
Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. Sc. R. 323 (1992); Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, A
Preference for Deference? The Supreme Court and Judicial Reviews, 57 POL. RES. Q. 131
(2004); Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at Originalism, 36 LAW &
SOC'YREV. 113 (2002).
Journal of Law & Policy
the Supreme Court, one could examine the extent to which Justices
disagree over "what the case is about" rather than how best to resolve
the case.2 In order to tap into that consideration, they look at factors
such as legal provision, issue, authority for decision, declaration of
unconstitutionality, and alteration of precedent. But might these
factors be driven by ideological concerns? In other words, might
strategic justices frame cases in ways that best suit their preferred
outcome? Or might liberal and conservative justices see cases
differently? This Article focuses on these possibilities by testing for
ideological components in two modes of legal interpretation-
originalism and legislative history-for judges of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Are these legal devices used in
pursuit of policy or are they instead determinative (at least partially)
of outcomes? Justice Scalia remains, of course, the most famous
proponent of originalism.3 Is it a coincidence that he is also one of the
most conservative members of the Supreme Court? Justice Breyer
suggests that one should interpret the Constitution in light of its
democratic aims and champions the use of legislative history to enact
the will of the people. 4 Is it a coincidence that he is one of the more
liberal Justices?
This Article questions whether consistency in legal interpretation
is truly a manifestation of the influence of law or instead a means to a
preferred policy end. Part I of this Article discusses the legal
interpretive tools of originalism and legislative history and how they
might influence outcomes in cases. Part Ii discusses judicial decision-
making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals and justifies their use in the
analysis. Parts III and IV offer information on our data and
methodology, as well as a discussion of the results. Finally, in Part V,
we find that the use of legal interpretive strategies are indeed, at least
in part, ideologically-driven, though not in a straightforward way. We
conclude that arguments suggesting that legal interpretation is
2. Sara C. Benesh & Harold Spaeth, The Constraint of Law: A Study of Supreme Court
Dissensus, 35 AM. POL. RES. 755 (2007).
3. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
4. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005).
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determinative and hence alleviates room for attitudinally-motivated
outcomes are over stated.
I. LEGAL INTERPRETATION
"Making sense of legal interpretation in theory is not the same as
making sense of it in practice." 5 There are few points of agreement in
the debate over legal interpretation. However, most judges and
scholars agree that the text of the statute or constitutional provision is
6the starting point. In addition, judges and legal academics accept that
courts will rely heavily on their previous decisions interpreting the
statute or constitutional provision in question. Beyond the text and
precedent, however, considerable disagreement exists over the
appropriate tools with which to derive a statute's or constitutional
provision's meaning.
Consider, for example, the relationship between a commitment to
originalism and an acceptance of legislative history. If a judge desires
to know the original meaning of any legal document, he or she might
find both originalist documents and legislative history attractive. Yet,
some judges embrace originalism but shy away from the potentially
unwieldy documents of legislative history in an effort to promote
legal interpretation that is more rule-bound and formal. 8 (An
argument can be quite forcefully made, though, that the legal history
surrounding the drafting of the Constitution is equally cumbersome.)
Similarly, a judge may dislike legislative history either because the
judge is non-originalist (i.e., has no interest in the intent of the
drafter), or because the judge is a formalist preferring rules over
5. Czamezki & Ford, supra note 1, at 853.
6. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 513 879 (2d ed. 1995);
Bluewater Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("We begin our interpretation of
the provision with the assumption that legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning
of the words used.") (internal citations omitted).
7. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities
for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
8. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 173-75 (1996)
(discussing "hard originalism" as an attempt to make constitutional and statutory interpretation
rule-like).
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standards (i.e., legislative history documents open up far too many
legal avenues compared to the plain text of the document). 9
Indeed, two current Justices, Scalia and Breyer, disagree mightily
over how best to make sense of the written words of Congress and
the Founders. This section focuses on the warring interpretive
strategies of originalism and legislative history, championed by these
two Justices as well as by other judges and legal scholars.
A. Originalism
Professor Keith Whittington describes "the critical originalist
directive" as the position that "the Constitution should be interpreted
according to the understandings made public at the time of the
drafting and ratification. '  Justice Scalia believes that a judge who
subscribes to an originalist view of interpreting a constitutional or
statutory provision would agree with the following: "Laws mean
what they actually say, not what legislators intended them to say but
did not write into the law's text .... [I]t is the original meaning of
the text ... that should govern ...... This is a rule-bound method of
deciding cases, arguably constraining the applying judge to only
those interpretations of the Constitution or of a statute that are
reasonably inferred from the original public understanding of the
document's text. 2 This means that the substance of a constitutional
provision might be gleaned via contemporaneous dictionaries or The
Federalist Papers, as opposed to the notes of James Madison.
As Justice Scalia recently stated in an address to The Federalist
Society, "Scalia does have a philosophy, it's called originalism.
That's what prevents him from doing the things he would like to
9. Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 636,
638 (1999) (stating that formalists are committed "to promoting compliance with all applicable
legal formalities (whether or not they make sense in the individual case), to ensuring rule-bound
law (even if application of the rule, statutory or contractual, makes little sense in the individual
case), and to constraining the discretion ofjudges in deciding cases").
10. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 35 (1999).
11. SCALIA, supra note 3, at vii.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 602 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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do.... ,1 Originalism, according to its proponents, reduces judicial
discretion and narrows the set of plausible outcomes. Even so, one
substantial difficulty with originalism is that it cannot answer all legal
queries. The original meaning of many constitutional provisions is
unknown and the meaning of others is disputed. 14 In addition, formal
originalism may provide no window into statutory interpretation
cases of first impression; perhaps this is why overlap exists between
originalists and textualists. That said, if, as Judge Robert Bork
suggests, principles of originalism can apply to statutory
interpretation,' 5 then why would one rely on the meaning of the plain
language of the text while rejecting any insight provided by the
legislative history?
B. Legislative History
Other efforts to find meaning in legislation seek not only to
determine what the words in a legal document mean, but also what
the legislators who drafted the statute intended by the words. This
approach is best characterized by a reliance on or use of legislative
history. In practice, legislative history is a commonly used
interpretive tool.
Despite this, there remains continued disagreement among both
judges and legal scholars about the legitimacy of its usage. Such
disagreement has ebbed and flowed over the decades. In 1930, Max
Radin claimed that there was "no general agreement" on the
appropriate use of legislative history in statutory interpretation.
16
However, soon thereafter, most lawyers accepted the validity of
legislative history.1 7 Jorge Carro and Andrew Brann, looking at
13. Jonathan Ewing, Scalia Dismisses "Living Constitution," BREITBART.COM, Feb. 14,
2006, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id-D8FP4G40E&show article-1.
14. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 88 95 (2004).
15. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 144-45 (1990).
16. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 872 (1930).
17. See Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV.
L. REV. 370, 380 (1947) ("Despite earlier doubts, committee reports, committee amendments,
responsible explanations on the floor, and similar legislative materials may now be considered
by a federal court interpreting a statute, even when the words, taken alone, have an
unambiguous meaning."); The Johnson Act: Defining a "Plain, Speedy, and Efficient Remedy
2009]
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Supreme Court case law from 1938 to 1979, "detect[ed] a firm
evolution that [went] from the almost absolute rejection of the use of
legislative history in statutory interpretation to an almost absolute
acceptance." 8
But while legislative history is a common judicial tool, research
indicates the rate of usage has declined, at least in the Supreme
Court.1 9 Although legislative history has lost popularity since the
Burger Court, it has been argued that Justice Scalia's emergence on
the Court "has not only blunted the growth of use of legislative
history, but has led to its substantial decline," further inhibiting its
use since the 1980s and early 1990s. 20 Scalia has continued his
assault on legislative history. At his confirmation hearings, Scalia
stated that if he "could create the world anew," he would get rid of
21legislative history. Once on the Court, Scalia has at times refused to
join sections or footnotes of majority opinions that deal with
legislative history.22
Meanwhile, Justice Breyer champions legislative history and
argues that "history that shows what the language likely meant to
those who wrote it" should be relevant to a judge's inquiry with
respect to a specific statute.2 3 He argues that consideration of the
purpose of a statute "helps to implement the public's will and is
therefore consistent with the Constitution's democratic purpose. 24
in the State Courts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 813, 826 (1937) ("A few courts have forbidden the use of
these materials, but the strong approval of a considerable body of authority now points to their
free employability.").
18. Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of
Legislative Histories: A StatisticalAnalysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 296 (1982).
19. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History?
Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220,
220 21 (2006); Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative
History: The Impact of Justice Scalia's Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 386-87 (1999).
20. Koby, supra note 19, at 387, 395; see also Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 19, at 221.
21. Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 105-06 (1986).
22. See, e.g., S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 373 (2006); KP
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression 1, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 113 (2004); Moseley v.
V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 420 (2003); Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520
U.S. 953, 955 (1997); United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S.
213, 215 (1996).
23. BREYER, supra note 4, at 7.
24. Id. at 99.
[Vol. 29:113
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C. How Interpretative Strategies Might Influence Outcomes
Little research addresses the influence of interpretive strategies on
judicial decision-making. While most research focuses on the
question of whether use of interpretive strategies are, in themselves,
evidence of the influence of the "legal," some articles do consider the
questions of how and why interpretive strategies might influence
outcomes, or whether interpretive tools are post hoc justifications of
prior-held desires for a particular disposition in a particular case.
Professors Brudney and Ditslear, for example, study the use of
legislative history in the U.S. Supreme Court, finding that such use
has declined (as mentioned above) and that its use is not
straightforwardly ideological.2 5 Indeed, while liberal Justices are
more likely to invoke legislative intent than are conservatives, they
do not predominantly reach liberal outcomes in doing so. Brudney
and Ditslear suggest that, rather than ideology, the frequent use of
legislative history might be an interpretive philosophy regarding the
role of the Court and Congress.26 They argue that it moderates
outcomes and may be a legitimizing influence for the Court.
Professors Gates and Phelps, on the other hand, consider the use
of "intentionalism" in the decision-making of Justices Rehnquist (a
proponent) and Brennan (an opponent), seeking to determine whether
the invocation of the Framers was exclusive to one ideology and
whether it was influential as to outcomes. 28 They find that neither
Brennan nor Rehnquist use the method often, that there is no large
difference between the two in how often they use it or to what extent
it is controlling (most often, it is not), and that each Justice uses the
interpretive strategy to reach the outcome they personally prefer. 29 In
other words, while it is not often controlling and is not often invoked,
when one of the two Justices used intentionalism in their opinions,
they did so to reach their preferred policy outcome. Consistent with
25. Burdney & Ditslear, supra note 19, at 228 29.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. John B. Gates & Glenn A. Phelps, Intentionalism in Constitutional Opinions, 49 POL.
RES. Q. 245 (1996).
29. Id. at 257.
2009]
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an attitudinal model formulation,30 Gates and Phelps argue that the
intent of the framers is a tool, enabling the Justices to reach the
outcomes they prefer (at least these two Justices, for the decisions
under study).3'
Finally, Professors Corley, Howard, and Nixon study use of The
Federalist Papers, seeking to uncover the influence of the Papers
(and hence, originalism) on outcomes as a pure legal influence on
decision-making.32 They note an increase in citations to The
Federalist Papers, which many take to be a sign that the Justices are
relying more heavily on the intent of the Framers, a legalistic
criterion.33 However, their research shows that references to The
Federalist Papers, rather than being a constraint on ideological
decision-making, facilitate it.34 Indeed, liberal Justices are far less
likely to cite to The Federalist Papers than are conservative Justices,
and all Justices are more likely to cite to them when in need of
additional legitimacy (i.e., in close cases, in cases in which they
declare legislation unconstitutional or overturn precedent, and in
cases when separate opinions in the case also cite to them). 35 In
addition, they find that the rise in citations to The Federalist Papers
36over time is largely a result of increased dissensus on the Court. In
short, the evidence suggests that legitimacy needs and ideology drive
citations to this source of original intent, not a legally-driven search
for authority or the "right" answer.
In general, based on the studies discussed above and the
conventional wisdom, as well as the prevalence of attitudinal
expectations about judicial behavior, there is an expected relationship
between interpretive strategy and ideology. Indeed, originalism is
thought to be preferred by conservative jurists and rarely finds
traction with more liberal judges and scholars.3  Though some
30. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
31. Gates & Phelps, supra note 28, at 257.
32. Pamela C. Corley, Robert M. Howard & David C. Nixon, The Supreme Court and
Opinion Content: The Use of the Federalist Papers, 58 POL. RES. Q. 329 (2005).
33. Id. at 330.
34. Id. at 339.
35. Id. at 335 36.
36. Id. at 337 38.
37. But see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)
[Vol. 29:113
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conservatives, such as Judge Posner, are not originalists,38 the
movement is strongly aligned with the most conservative members of
the judiciary.
Justice Scalia, for example, relies on the writings of the Framers
to "display how the text of the Constitution was originally
understood. 3 9 Similarly, Justice Thomas has been known to cite The
Federalist Papers "to show how far we have departed from the
original understanding" of the United States Constitution.40 Judge
Bork states "that judges must always be guided by the original
understanding of the Constitution's provisions.... [N]o set of
propositions is too preposterous to be espoused by a judge or a law
professor who has cast loose from the historical Constitution.",
4 1
Professor Cass Sunstein argues that Republican presidents have
sought to appoint originalists to the federal bench; Scalia and Thomas
(and Bork) fall squarely within this category.42 These originalist
judges have been supported by the Conservative Right and belittled
by the Liberal Left.
43
Many claim that adoption of originalism as an interpretive
strategy reduces the discretion judges have, thereby curbing the
influence of ideology on their votes.4 4 However, if originalism is
statistically capable of increasing the probability of a conservative
vote, discretion may not be taken from the judge; rather, conservative
outcomes are more likely to result from originalist jurisprudence. On
the other hand, invocations of originalism may be a choice and
preference in favor of predictability and ease of decision-making
regardless of ideological outcome.
(rejecting the idea that the Constitution should be construed in accordance with the current
times, and arguing that using amendments to change the meaning of the Constitution was "good
for our Fathers, and being somewhat old fashioned I must add it is good enough for me"); Akhil
Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term, Foreward: The Document and the Doctrine, 114
Harv. L. Rev. 26 (2000).
38. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2003).
39. SCALIA, supra note 3, at 38.
40. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
41. BORK, supra note 15, at 351 52.
42. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE
WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005).
43. See MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS DESTROYING
AMERICA (2005).
44. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 3, at 45-46.
2009]
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Relatedly, legislative history may be expected to be negatively
related to a conservative vote, it being a tool favored by more liberal
jurists. Conservative jurists like Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook
disfavor its use 4  while Justice Breyer, for example, defends
legislative history.46 Professors Eskridge and Frickey suggest that an
ideological component exists in the use of legislative history as
well.
47
All of this begs the question, which comes first? Is it that
conservative jurists are expected to find originalism more seductive
and liberals legislative history more persuasive? Or, are conservative
outcomes more likely using originalism, liberal outcomes more likely
using legislative history, and hence conservative and liberal justices
choose them in order to reach their preferred outcomes? We attempt
to shed some light on this question of causality as well as disentangle
the effects of interpretation and ideology in the analysis below.
II. DECISION-MAKING ON THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS
The U.S. Courts of Appeals, charged with offering to every losing
federal defendant their one appeal, are ideal laboratories in which to
carefully analyze the ways in which legal interpretive strategies affect
decisions. Given the infrequency of Supreme Court review of Court
of Appeals decisions, these courts are the final hope for most litigants
in federal court, hearing over 98% of all federal appeals each year.48
Scholarship that considers the influences on the decisions at this level
of court, attempts to predict how any given case or statute will fare,
tries to determine how much confidence we should have in these
judgments, or examines the importance (or lack thereof) of the
nominations and confirmations process to policy in the United States
is, therefore, especially important. This is where policy-making in
American federal courts occurs. Disentangling the effects of law and
45. Id. at 29 30; Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 441 (1990).
46. BREYER, supra note 4, at 85-101.
47. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 603 13.
48. DONALD R. SONGER, REGINALD S. SHEEHAN & SUSAN B. HAIRE, CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 17 (2000).
[Vol. 29:1 13
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ideology here promises to bring us closer to knowing what drives
decisions at this important level.
In the Courts of Appeals, due to their institutional position, the
role of ideology is likely tempered, and law might have a more
substantial effect on decision-making. 49  Such intermediate-level
courts, understood to be subservient to the U.S. Supreme Court,
should be bound by Supreme Court precedent. 50 Additionally, given
the circuit courts' lack of docket control, "law" should matter more
here. With the large number of "easy" cases these courts hear and the
heavy caseload they bear, deference to the lower courts is rampant
and disagreement among judges rare.5' Unlike the U.S. Supreme
Court, whose Justices fill its docket with hand-picked legally-
challenging or ideologically-salient cases, basic legal interpretive
strategies will likely have greater impact in the less dynamic,
aggregate caseload of the Courts of Appeals. Thus, legal interpretive
strategies may expeditiously resolve the conflicts with which this
level of court deals (even if this is not necessarily the case at the
Supreme Court level).52
49. See DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
(2002); Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV.
1457 (2003); Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin's Chain
Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156 (2005).
50. See SARA C. BENESH, THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LAW OF CONFESSIONS:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE HIERARCHY OF JUSTICE (2002); Donald Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal &
Charles Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme
Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. Sci. 673 (1994).
51. See VIRGTNIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK,
JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING
110, 117 (2006); Cross, supra note 49; Erin B. Kaheny, Susan Brodie Haire & Sara C. Benesh,
Change over Tenure: Voting, Variance, and Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 52
AM. J. POL. Sci. 490 (2008). According to the Songer Database and its update, both of which
are random samples by circuit by year, between 1925 and 2002, about 88% of the decisions
made in the circuit courts were unanimous (i.e., they had neither concurring nor dissenting
opinions attached). See Appeals Court Data, http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/appctdata.htm
(follow "Original Appeals Court Database (1925 1996)" and "Update to Appeals Court
Database (1997-2002)" hyperlinks) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009); Ashlyn K. Kuersten & Susan B.
Haire, Update to the Appeals Court Database (2007), http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/
appctdata.htm.
52. See Howard & Segal, supra note 1. Our focus on the Seventh Circuit in particular is
pragmatic; it is the only one for which career usage scores over interpretative strategies are
available.
2009]
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN
A. Data
Are legal interpretive strategies purely legal, or are they driven-
in part-by desired ideological outcome? Judge Easterbrook
maintains, with respect to a text-based interpretive strategy, that, "If
the textualist is interpreting laws written in a more conservative era,
the results will appear 'conservative' to modern eyes .... When the
text is to the left of today's consensus, textualism produces results
that are politically 'liberal."', 5 3  Is this confirmed in empirical
analysis?
In order to test the effects of legal interpretation, all non-
unanimous decisions 4 made by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit from the 1997 term through the 2003 term in the
areas of criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due
process, and privacy were coded for the ideological direction of their
outcomes.55 Using judge vote as the unit of analysis and direction of
vote (as coded in the Songer database) 56 as the dependent variable,
this project seeks to determine whether modes of legal interpretation
(coded as career usage scores for each individual judge's invocation
of originalism and legislative history as tools of interpretation), after
53. Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 50.
54. Non-unanimous cases are those eliciting either a dissenting opinion or a concurrence
from one of the judges on the three-judge panel. Scholars have shown that unanimous cases can
mask disagreement among judges and may sometimes give the misleading impression that a
particular case is "easy." While there are certainly exceptions, perhaps where a collegial judge
defers to his or her more interested colleagues, many unanimous cases are easy (or at least
easier than the non-unanimous cases), either because the outcomes are resolved by precedent or
because the judges' policy preferences on the issue are similar. We use only nonconsensual
cases in order to give ideology an opportunity to exert some influence, making our test of
ideology versus legal interpretation a more rigorous one. Pragmatically, the data we use were
collected for another project on coalitions, hence the lack of interest in unanimous decisions.
55. The project is limited to these issue areas because in other areas it is not possible to
define a liberal or conservative outcome. Cases heard en banc, panel decisions vacated on
rehearing, dissents from anything but the majority opinion (dissents from denials of rehearing,
denials of rehearing en banc, and petitions for rehearing or stay), or cases in which Judge Jesse
Eschbach participated (because there were so few) are excluded. Songer's coding helps
determine whether outcomes are ideologically liberal or conservative. See Songer, supra note
51.
56. Id.
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controlling for ideology (measured by career liberalism scores
compiled from the Songer database), predict the decision.
B. Model of Decision-Making
This section describes how the model's variables are
operationalized, including measures of the use of legal interpretative
strategies, measures of ideology, and controls for lower court
direction and liberalism of the Supreme Court in the term previous to
the decision. It treats each in turn.
1. Modes of Legal Interpretation
The measures for modes of legal interpretation are derived from
the research of law professors Jason Czarnezki and William Ford.
57
Czarnezki and Ford (and their research assistants) coded every
opinion (majority, dissent, concurrence, and dubitante)58 written by
sixteen current and former judges on the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals over the course of their careers (excluding those cases here
under study) for the use of various modes of legal interpretation.5 9
Difficulties arise in measuring the "law," especially in determining
how best to code cases for reliance on various strategies of legal
interpretation. The Czarnezki and Ford strategy considered judicial
use of interpretive documents and phrases as evidenced by reliance
upon them in opinions written by individual judges. This provided a
proxy for the use of interpretive strategies overall. This Article
specifically considers originalism (interpreting the Constitution in
light of the meaning as understood at the time of drafting) and
legislative history (the use of committee reports, floor speeches, or
other tools to discern what legislators meant when they wrote specific
words into statutes). Is reliance on such interpretive tools
ideologically motivated, or separately determinative of outcomes?
57. Czamezki & Ford, supra note 1.
58. A dubitante opinion is written when a judge desires to express reservations about the
majority's conclusion, but does not deem his or her reservations to rise to a level justifying a
concurring or dissenting opinion. See Jason J. Czamezki, The Dubitante Opinion, 39 AKRON L.
REV. 1 (2006).
59. Czamezki & Ford, supra note 1, at 856 57.
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In order to code for each interpretive strategy, Czarnezki and Ford
use LEXIS searches coupled with extensive content analysis in order
to differentiate between frequent mention of such tools and real
reliance upon them in decision-making.60 Their "filtered" career
scores, which compute the percentage of a given judge's written
opinions that rely on a particular tool, prove most valuable. In order
to be included in this "reliance" category, a judge had to have used
the interpretive tool to interpret a statute or constitutional provision.
In other words, the judge needed to have positively relied on the tool
in his or her legal analysis of the case, not merely mentioned it.61 In
this Article, these scores are used as a measure of how a given judge
legally approaches a case. The Article then explores the impact of the
judge's legal philosophy on his or her vote in a given case.
However, given the anticipated role of ideology in the career
usage scores of the judges, the career usage scores are first purged of
the impact of ideology by regressing career ideology score on the
career usage scores for both originalism and legislative history. The
saved residuals are then used as measures of the frequency of usage
in the model of judge votes. Hence, the measures of originalism and
of legislative history can be said to have been "cleaned" of the
influence of the career liberalism score of each judge and therefore
independent from ideology.
62
60. The LEXIS searches were as follows: the original meaning of the Constitution
(("original understanding" or "original intent" or "originalism" or "original meaning" or
ratifie!) /10 (constitution! or amendment or clause)), or (Federalist or "founding fathers" or
"constitutional convention"), or (framers 5 constitution! or amendment or clause); legislative
history ("legislative history" or "committee report" or "U.S.C.C.A.N." or "floor debate" or
"committee statement" or "committee hearing" or "legislative counsel" or "H.R." or "S.J. Res."
or "Cong. Rec." or "S. Res." or "H.R.J. Res." or "S. Doc. No." or "S. Rep."). Czamezki &
Ford, supra note 1, at 862 n.95.
61. Id. at 876.
62. The result of those regressions are as follows (standard errors in parentheses): Leghist
3.51 (0.25) + 19.47 (1.06) Career Ideology + e. Career ideology is highly significant and
signed such that as liberalism increases, the extent to which the judge uses legislative history
also increases. Originalism - 0.186 (0.027) + 0.75 (0.114) Career Ideology + e. Again, career
ideology is significant, but much less influential (as seen by the coefficient) and in the opposite
direction as one might posit; as liberalism goes up, the career originalism score goes up.
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2. Ideology
In order to control for what most scholars have found to be at least
somewhat influential, the model includes a measure of judge
ideology, created to comport with the legal interpretative scores. As
those scores are career scores and, as noted above, are employed as
measures of the way in which a judge legally approaches a given
case, a measure for ideology that approximates a career score is
included as well, measuring the ideological approach favored by a
given judge. In order to calculate this measure, the Songer Database
is used, from which the percentage of cases voted on by each judge in
an ideologically liberal direction over the course of those votes from
his or her career captured in the Songer data are calculated.63 The
measure, then, should decrease the likelihood that a conservative vote
will be reached; as the judge's liberalism increases, any given case
she decides should be less likely to be conservative in nature,
especially since unanimous decisions are excluded, as noted above.
Other measures of ideology are measured at the individual level,
rather than the career level, and while they might help predict the
likelihood of a conservative vote in a given case, they tap into
different considerations (e.g., nominations and confirmations) than
64does a score based on career voting.
63. The Songer data is a sample by circuit, so some judges have more votes than others
and the measure does not consider every vote cast by any of the judges in the Seventh Circuit. It
should, however, approximate the average as the sample is random. Songer, supra note 51.
64. An appointment-based measure of ideology is popular in the research analyzing
circuit court decision-making; however, the influence of that measure is also estimated. The
most widely-used score based on the appointment derives from Michael W. Giles, Virginia A.
Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection
Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623 (2001). Their measure, based on Poole and Rosenthal's
NOMINATE scores for the President when sentorial courtesy does not operate and for the
home state Senator(s) when senatorial courtesy does operate ranges from -1 (most liberal) to +1
(most conservative). See KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997); Keith T. Poole, Recovering a Basic Space
from a Set oflssue Scales, 42 AM. J. POL. SC. 954 (1998). See infra note 67 for the findings
when employing the "GHP" scores, rather than career liberalism.
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3. Control Variables
Finally, control variables must be added. These controls include,
first, the directionality of the lower court in recognition that the
Courts of Appeals are highly deferential to the lower court's decision.
This is both legally and contextually defensible. Legally, there are
standards of review that require deference to the lower court's
determination of the facts at issue. Contextually, because the Court of
Appeals has a mandatory docket, they will arguably receive many
factually-resolvable cases (i.e., "easy" cases). For that reason, the
Court of Appeals should often defer to the lower court's decision for
61both legal and merit-related reasons.
In addition to deference to the lower court, much research has
66suggested that the Courts of Appeals defer to the Supreme Court. In
order to control for the potential influence of the U.S. Supreme Court
on decision-making by its subordinates, a measure of the Supreme
Court's overall liberalism in the term prior to the one at issue in the
circuit court case is also included (since the Court, if it has an impact,
can only have that impact after it has made its decision).
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
TABLE 1: INFLUENCE OF LEGAL INTERPRETIVE STRATEGIES ON
IDEOLOGICAL OUTCOMES
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Error Sig Levela
Originalism 2.28 0.58 0.00
Legislative History -0.09 0.06 0.06
Career Liberalism 1.32 1.12 0.12
Lower Court Liberal -1.19 0.22 0.00
Supreme Court Liberalism -1.96 2.38 0.21
Constant 2.14 1.10 0.05
'All significance levels are for one-tailed tests.
Dependent Variable: 1 conservative vote, 0 liberal vote
N 476. Model Fit: Wald chi2 45.97. prob > chi2 0.00 pseudo R2 0.10; Area
under ROC = 0.72; PRE = 7.88%
65. Of course, given the focus only on non-unanimous cases, such deference may be less
notable than in other studies that include unanimous decisions as well.
66. See BENESH, supra note 50; Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 50.
[Vol. 29:113
The Ideology of Legal Interpretation
The results of our primary analysis can be seen in Table 1. Using
one-tailed tests, we find that as career usage of legislative history
scores increases, a judge is less likely to vote conservatively in any
given case, though the significance of the variable does not quite
reach the conventional p<0.05 standard (as seen in the table, p<0.06
for this variable). In addition, and as expected, as career usage of
originalism increases, a judge is more likely to vote conservatively in
any given case. It is also the case that, when the lower court reached a
liberal outcome, the circuit judge is less likely to vote conservatively
(and hence more likely to uphold the lower court's liberal vote).
Finally, neither career liberalism nor Supreme Court liberalism has a
significant impact on the vote. Career liberalism is actually in the
opposite direction as that suggested by the research.67 In terms of
predicted probabilities, compared to the situation in which all
variables are held at their respective means, a one-standard-deviation
increase in use of legislative history makes a conservative outcome
3.5% less likely, while a one-standard-deviation increase in use of
originalism makes a conservative outcome 8.2% more likely. A case
decided liberally in the lower court is 15.6% less likely to be decided
conservatively by the circuit; a case decided conservatively by the
lower court is 7.7% more likely to be decided conservatively.68
67. "GHP" scores perform similarly; they do not reach standard levels of significance and
are incorrectly signed. Using them to purge ideology from the interpretive measures also results
in strikingly similar results. The model fit is worse using GHP scores, but nothing else
appreciably changes. Hence, because the legal interpretation scores are measured as career
scores, the career liberalism scores are preferable.
68. The predicted probability of a conservative vote is 0.753 when all variables are at their
respective means.
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TABLE 2: INFLUENCE OF LEGAL INTERPRETIVE STRATEGIES ON
IDEOLOGICAL OUTCOMES FOR LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE JUDGES
Liberal Judges Only
Variable
Originalism
Legislative History
Career Liberalism
Lower Court Liberal
Supreme Court Liberalism
Constant
Conservative Judges Only
Variable
Originalism
Legislative History
Career Liberalism
Lower Court Liberal
Supreme Court Liberalism
Constant
Coefficient
-1.78
-0.54
-40.92
-0.62
4.65
12.67
Coefficient
4.90
-0.05
-1.93
-1.47
-3.32
3.43
Robust Std. Error
1.04
0.17
11.18
0.44
6.04
4.27
Robust Std. Error
1.09
0.07
1.82
0.27
2.78
1.31
Sig Levela
0.09
0.00
0.00
0.08
0.22
0.00
Sig Levela
0.00
0.23
0.15
0.00
0.12
0.01
a All significance levels are for one-tailed tests except for originalism for liberal
judges. as it is wrongly signed.
Dependent Variable: 1 conservative vote, 0 liberal vote
Liberal Judges: N 145. Model Fit: Wald chi2 19.51, prob > chi2 0.00; pseudo
R2 = 0.15; Area under ROC=0.76; PRE 9.5%. Conservative Judges: N=331.
Model Fit: Wald chi2 = 54.81, prob > chi2 0.00; pseudo R2 = 0.1523; Area under
ROC= 0.76; PRE = 8.17%.
It remains unclear, however, whether liberal and conservative
judges might still behave distinctively when it comes to employing
either legislative history or originalism as a tool to better understand
texts. As noted above, in the regressions purging ideology from the
career interpretive scores, the former was significantly related to the
latter. Indeed, it is also true that career originalism predicts career
ideology fairly well, as does career legislative history use. Again,
though, both are positive (originalism would be expected to be
negative) and statistically significant, though their coefficients are
much smaller than the coefficient on ideology in the regressions on
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the interpretive scores. 69 This provides some indication that liberal
and conservative judges are different in terms of their reliance on
these tools and the ideological connection they may have with them.
Table 2 presents results of two models attempting to test that notion.
Defining "liberal" as those judges with a career liberalism score of
more than 0.25,70 the table demonstrates that there are clear
differences across judges in the relationship between use of
interpretive strategy, ideology, and a given vote in a given case. The
"liberal" judges are far more influenced by ideology and their use of
a tool always decreases the likelihood of a conservative vote. These
judges appear to use the tools to their ideological advantage; they
employ the tools to reach liberal outcomes. The conservative judges,
on the other hand, enhance the likelihood of a conservative vote when
they use originalism and decrease that likelihood when they rely on
legislative history (though not to a statistically significant degree in
the latter case). Ideology works in the expected direction, though it
does not attain conventional levels of statistical significance. This
suggests that judges employ tools differentially and that, perhaps,
liberal judges are more ideological than conservative judges.
CONCLUSION
It is indeed the case that judges who invoke originalism frequently
in their opinions vote more conservatively in this set of cases. In
addition, judges who frequently cite legislative history are more
likely to vote liberally. Does this mean that judges are using legal
interpretive tools strategically in order to advance their preferred
resolution of a case? Maybe so, especially given the findings from the
regression focusing on liberal justices only. Does it mean that
69. The results of those regressions are (standard errors in parentheses): Career Liberalism
0.182 (0.007) + 0.11 (0.017)Originalism + e; Career Liberalism = 0.055 (0.01) + 0.021
(0.00 I)Legislative History + e.
70. The range of liberalism score was 0 to 0.50. A score of 0.25 or greater included the
top 30% of liberal voting judges.
71. Of course, caution should be used in attributing too much to these findings. Labeling a
judge as "liberal" because the judge voted in a liberal direction in more than 25% of the cases
decided over the course of his or her career is a fairly low threshold for liberalism. However,
using the GHP scores as the liberal/conservative cutoff, similar findings emerge, though some
signs switch on the insignificant variables (Liberal = GHP > 0.).
2009]
Journal of Law & Policy
conservatives tend to be more convinced by originalist interpretations
and hence employ them more often? Possibly. Does this evidence
show definitely which comes first-the decision or the rationale? It
does not, as bivariate regressions testing the influence of career
ideology on career tool usage and vice versa both produce significant
coefficients. However, the analysis here does show that at least some
attempts to justify a particular version of "the best way in which to
interpret the Constitution or a statute" by using terms that suggest its
neutrality may be disingenuous or post hoc rationalizations of
ideological decisions.
72
Why does this matter? Many have argued that the legitimacy of
the Supreme Court stems in part from citizen beliefs that they decide
cases in an impartial, non-ideological way. The use of interpretive
strategies attempts to perpetuate that belief, with Scalia arguing that
such reliance eliminates much of the room to politically maneuver in
decision-making on the Court. This Article-as well as others
exploring similar relationships at the Supreme Court level-casts
some doubt on those claims, doubt that is supported by common-
sense notions about the difficulty in discerning the intent either of the
Framers or of legislators, especially due to lack of collective intent
and lack of accurate descriptions of motivations. Judicial opinions,
normatively, attempt to justify the decision made by the court or by
the judge with evidence legitimizing that outcome. Perhaps some
evidence is selected with the preferred outcome already in mind.
72. Of course, the reader should recognize that not all cases in the dataset would be
affected by originalism or legislative history, and there may be other legal influences on
decisions in those cases not captured by the model. It should also be noted that we consider a
limited dataset in this Article.
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